The Elusive 'Link' to Infringement in the Copyright Amendment Bill 2006: Now You See It, Now You Don't by Clapperton, Dale M.
 Author version 
THE ELUSIVE ‘LINK’ TO INFRINGEMENT IN 
THE COPYRIGHT AMENDMENT BILL 2006 
Now You See It, Now You Don’t. 
 
DALE CLAPPERTON†
 
This is an author version of an article which was first published in February 2007 in 
volume 19, issue 9 of the Australian Intellectual Property Law Bulletin at page 141. 
 
 
Anti-circumvention laws give legal protection to Technological Protection Measures 
(TPMs) which are used to protect copyright material.  This legal protection is created 
by prohibiting commercial dealings in tools which can circumvent TPMs, and often by 
prohibiting the act itself of circumventing a TPM. 
 
TPMs typically operate by controlling access to the protected material, or preventing 
copying of the protected material, or both.  Because controlling access to copyright 
material is not an exclusive right of a copyright owner, and because TPMs prevent 
non-infringing as well as infringing copying, TPMs have given copyright owners a 
great deal of power, and the use of TPMs – as well as their legal protection – has 
caused much controversy. 
 
The scope of access control protection 
 
One of the key issues in the debate over the proper scope of anti-circumvention laws 
is this: should the laws protect access controls which are designed to prevent or 
inhibit the infringement of copyright (the so-called ‘link’ to infringement), or should the 
laws protect all access controls, regardless of purpose or function (a ‘pure’ access 
control)? 
 
This issue is a divisive one.  Copyright holders argue strongly in favour of protection 
for pure access controls.  Groups representing users of copyright material argue 
equally strongly that access controls ought not to be protected; but if they are, then 
protection must extend only to access controls which prevent or inhibit an 
infringement of copyright. 
 
The US experience – anti-competitive abuses of access controls 
 
Much of the case law on the United States’ anti-circumvention law (the Digital 
Millennium Copyright Act or DMCA) concerns the use of TPMs and anti-
circumvention laws not to prevent infringement of copyright, but to suppress 
competition. 
 
In Chamberlain v Skylink,1 Chamberlain tried to use the DMCA to prevent Skylink 
from producing a remote control which was compatible with Chamberlain’s garage 
door openers.  Chamberlain claimed that the software which operated the garage 
door opener was protected by copyright, and access to that software was protected 
by a ‘rolling code’ encryption system (i.e. a TPM).  Skylink’s compatible remote 
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controls circumvented the ‘rolling code’ encryption system to ‘access’ the software 
(i.e. to open the garage door). 
 
This case highlights the distinction between a pure access control, and an access 
control linked to infringement of copyright.  Even though Skylink’s competing remote 
control did not reproduce or otherwise infringe the copyright in the garage door 
opener software,2 if the DMCA protected pure access controls, Chamberlain could 
forbid competing remote controls from ‘accessing’ the software in the garage door 
opener. 
 
Chamberlain’s argument was summarised by the US Court of Appeals for the 
Federal Circuit: 
 
Chamberlain contends that Congress empowered manufacturers to prohibit 
consumers from using embedded software products in conjunction with competing 
products when it passed [the DMCA]. According to Chamberlain, all such uses of 
products containing copyrighted software to which a technological measure controlled 
access are now per se illegal under the DMCA unless the manufacturer provided 
consumers with explicit authorization.3
 
The Court upheld a decision of a lower court rejecting this construction, holding that 
the DMCA did not create new property rights in copyright, and observing that: 
 
Chamberlain's construction of the DMCA would allow virtually any company to 
attempt to leverage its sales into aftermarket monopolies – a practice that both the 
antitrust laws, and the doctrine of copyright misuse normally prohibit.4
 
The Federal Circuit concluded that on its proper construction, the circumvention 
device prohibition in the DMCA requires that post-circumvention, the copyright work 
can be accessed by unauthorised third parties in a manner that infringes or facilitates 
infringing a right protected by the Copyright Act. 
 
This ‘link’ to infringement of copyright is not present in the DMCA – on its face the 
DMCA would protect a pure access control.  However, the courts in Chamberlain v 
Skylink read down the relevant provisions of the DMCA to that extent, to better reflect 
what they believed to be the intent of Congress, and to avoid the adverse 
consequences which would flow from the construction advanced by Chamberlain. 
 
Other similar unsuccessful cases include an attempt by a printer manufacturer to 
prevent their toner cartridges from being refilled by unauthorised third party 
remanufacturers (who would have competed with the manufacturer in the market for 
toner cartridges),5 and an attempt by a computer hardware manufacturer to prevent 
third parties from servicing their equipment (in competition with the manufacturer’s 
services).6
 
Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 
 
The Australia-United States Free Trade Agreement (‘the FTA’) requires Australia to 
extend its existing anti-circumvention laws (which protects technology which 
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‘prevents or inhibits’ the infringement of copyright) and give protection to technology 
which ‘controls access to a protected work’.7  The Copyright Amendment Bill 2006 
(‘the Bill’) implements these obligations. 
 
In the time which has passed since the signing of the FTA, there has been heated 
debate as to the proper construction of the relevant sections of the FTA – and 
particularly whether the FTA requires anti-circumvention protection for pure access 
controls. 
 
The Commonwealth House of Representatives Standing Committee on Legal and 
Constitutional Affairs considered this issue when conducting a review into what 
exceptions should be created to the anti-circumvention laws required by the FTA.8   
 
The Committee heard testimony from a representative of the Office of International 
Law within the Attorney-General’s Department on the construction of the relevant 
clauses of the FTA.9  That testimony supported a construction which would protect 
access controls with a link to infringement of copyright, but not pure access controls. 
 
The Committee subsequently recommended that 
 
in the legislation implementing Article 17.4.7 of the Australia-United States Free 
Trade Agreement, the definition of technological protection measure/effective 
technological measure clearly require a direct link between access control and 
copyright protection.10
 
The Committee also recommended that an exception be created for interoperability 
between computer programs and computer data,11 and that exceptions to the TPM 
regime should not be excludable by contract.12
 
This recommendation was subsequently accepted by the government without 
qualification,13 and the exposure draft of legislation to implement these changes 
appeared to follow this recommendation.14  The exposure draft required that a TPM 
or access control TPM (ACTPM) be 
 
designed, in the normal course of its operation, to prevent or inhibit the doing of an 
act: 
(i) that is comprised in the copyright; and 
(ii) that would infringe the copyright15 
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Groups representing the interests of users of copyrighted material supported the 
wording of the exposure draft as a measured response which would implement 
Australia’s FTA obligations in a manner consistent with the leading US judicial 
interpretations of the DMCA.16  Groups representing the interests of copyright owners 
vehemently opposed the wording of the exposure draft, on the basis that it did not 
comply with the FTA, would interfere with ‘new business models’,17 or both.18
 
In the relatively short space of time between the release of the exposure draft and 
the introduction of the Bill, the definitions of TPM and ACTPM underwent a diametric 
change – the link to infringement of copyright disappeared from the definition of 
ACTPM – without explanation or announcement.  The definition of ACTPM in the Bill 
required merely that it be used ‘in connection with the exercise of the copyright’.  The 
new definition of a TPM required that ‘in the normal course of its operation, [it] 
prevents, inhibits or restricts the doing of an act comprised in the copyright’.19 
(Emphasis added) 
 
The Bill was referred to the Senate Standing Committee on Legal and Constitutional 
Affairs, who conducted a hasty inquiry and public hearing.  The submissions made to 
the Committee were again generally predictable.  Groups representing users of 
copyright material advocated a return to the wording of the exposure draft; groups 
representing copyright owners welcomed the change. 
 
When questioned by the Committee about the apparent reversal of policy between 
the exposure draft and the Bill, representatives of the Attorney-General’s Department 
denied there had been any such policy change, blaming a ‘substantial 
misunderstanding of the government’s intention behind those exposure draft 
provisions’ for the change.20
 
Many commentators have found this explanation less than convincing.  The 
Committee report noted 
 
the apparent divergence between the view expressed by the [Attorney-General’s] 
Department in the course of the inquiry, and other previous interpretations of [the 
FTA] put forward by the Department and the Federal Government.21
 
The Committee report recommended that the definition of ACTPM be amended, 
replacing ‘in connection with the exercise of copyright’ with ‘prevents, inhibits or 
restricts the doing of an act comprised in copyright’, to harmonise the language used 
across the definitions of TPM and ACTPM.22
                                                
16 See, for example, the submissions of the Open Source Industry Association p 27, the Australian 
Libraries’ Copyright Committee and Australian Digital Alliance p 33, etc - http://tinyurl.com/y26ok3 (page 
numbers are references to the linked PDF file) 
17 It should be noted that some of the examples given of ‘new business models’ involve conduct which 
might be regarded as anti-competitive – e.g. tying the use of a computer game to a subscription-based 
online multiplayer gaming service offered by the game publisher, and preventing the use of any 
competing service. 
18 See, for example, the submissions of Reed Elsevier p 65, Viscopy p 68, ARIA p 72, the International 
Intellectual Property Alliance p 83, Australian Visual Software Distributors Association p 115, Copyright 
Agency Limited p 142, above n 17. 
19 The addition of ‘or restricts’ would seem to have little purpose other than legislating around the 
meaning of ‘prevent or inhibit’ endorsed by the High Court in Stevens v Sony (2005) 221 ALR 448.  The 
widening of the definition in this way may have the effect of giving protection to technology which merely 
deters or discourages infringement rather than preventing it, such as was the case in Stevens. 
20 Testimony of Ms Kirsti Haipola, 7 November 2006, 
http://www.aph.gov.au/hansard/senate/commttee/S9857.pdf at p 46-7. 
21 http://www.aph.gov.au/Senate/committee/legcon_ctte/copyright06/report/report.pdf at [3.139] 
22 Ibid at [3.155]. 
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The Committee made further recommendations, mirroring those of the earlier House 
of Representatives Committee, that the interoperability exceptions be amended to 
ensure they allow for interoperability between computer programs and computer 
data, and prohibit contracting out of exceptions.23
 
While no formal response to the Committee’s report has yet been made available, 
the government did not give effect to any of these recommendations.  Labor moved 
amendments in the Senate that would have implemented the recommendations, but 
those amendments were opposed by the government, despite their response to the 
earlier House of Representatives Committee report having accepted the need for a 
link to copyright protection, and the need for an exception to facilitate program-data 
interoperability. 
 
The current state of play 
 
Subject to two specific carve-outs, any technology which controls access to copyright 
material and is used ‘in connection with the exercise of the copyright’ will be 
protected as an ACTPM.  The meaning given to this phrase will determine the scope 
of protection for ACTPMs in Australia. 
 
While it is arguable that this phrase is intended to cover ‘traditional’ exploitation of 
copyright, and might not therefore extend to pure access controls (controlling access 
or use of copyright material not being an exclusive right of a copyright holder), for 
several reasons I think it unlikely that a court would adopt such a construction. 
 
First, notwithstanding denials from the Attorney-General’s Department, it seems 
obvious that a major reversal of government policy on the protection of ACTPMs 
occurred between the exposure draft and the Bill. 
 
Secondly, the government has ignored the recommendations of two separate 
parliamentary committees – both of which had a government majority – on the 
linkage issue.  This, plus the volumes of other extrinsic material which strongly 
suggests that the government intended to implement a broad protection for pure 
access controls, will make it difficult for a court to construe the scope of ACTPM 
protection narrowly. 
 
Lastly, the two specific carve-outs – which appeared in the legislation at the same 
time that the link to infringement disappeared – are arguably redundant if the narrow 
construction is adopted.  The carve-outs address certain situations involving region-
coding or anti-competitive conduct.  In these situations, infringement of copyright is 
unlikely to occur, and the carve-outs would seem only to be necessary if a broad 
construction of ACTPM had been intended. 
 
The two carve-outs are that a device, product, technology or component is not an 
ACTPM or TPM to the extent that it: 
 
(c) If the work or other subject matter is a cinematograph film or computer 
program (including a computer game) – controls geographic market 
segmentation by preventing the playback in Australia of a non-infringing copy 
of the work or other subject-matter acquired outside Australia; or 
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(d) If the work is a computer program that is embodied in a machine or device – 
restricts the use of goods (other than the work) or services in relation to the 
machine or device. 
 
Similar carve-outs exist for the definition of TPM.  The first carve-out is clearly 
intended to address the consumer welfare issue of DVD and computer game region-
coding, and the price discrimination facilitated by region-coding. 
 
The second carve-out is intended to address anti-competitive abuses of TPMs 
featured in well-known US cases such as Chamberlain v Skylink and Lexmark v 
Static Control.  Indeed, the explanatory memorandum to the Bill makes specific 
reference to these and other cases. 
 
In essence, the Government’s approach has been to abandon a link to infringement 
of copyright, which would protect against misuse of TPMs now and in the future, in 
favour of narrowly drafted static exceptions which may address the misuses of TPMs 
which have happened to date, but provide no protection against new and innovative 
misuse of TPMs. 
 
For example, the first carve-out applies only to computer software and 
cinematograph films.  TPMs which control geographic market segmentation of any 
other type of copyright material, such as literary or artistic works, sound recordings, 
television and sound broadcasts, or published editions will enjoy legal protection. 
 
The second applies only to a computer program embodied in a machine or device.  
Whether this would apply to any type of computer software, or only to computer 
software of an embedded nature, which is required for the machine or device to 
function, is uncertain.  Barring a very broad and probably unintended interpretation of 
‘computer program’ to included computer data, this exception would not apply to 
computer data protected by a TPM.  Thus, for example, Apple will maintain its 
monopoly on production and authorisation of devices permitted to interoperate with 
TPM-protected music purchased from the iTunes Music Store. 
 
Adopting such a carve-out with cases such as Lexmark v Static Control in mind also 
ignores the reality that due to significant differences between the US and Australia in 
the scope of copyright protection for functional computer code, and exceptions to 
copyright (these differences being unaddressed by the FTA), Lexmark and many 
other cases would almost certainly have been decided differently under Australian 
law.24
 
Difficulties with these carve-outs will almost certainly ensue when the meaning of ‘to 
the extent that’ is considered by a court.  The explanatory memorandum is clear that 
where a TPM has different functions, but each can be circumvented separately, each 
is to be treated as a separate TPM.  What then will happen when one TPM has many 
functions, one of which is region-coding, but each function cannot be circumvented 
individually? 
 
Clearly either the TPM as a whole must be protected, or not.  The former would 
frustrate the intent of Parliament and the letter of the law, while the latter would 
outrage copyright owners who would almost certainly lobby for amendments to 
restore the protection for such TPMs.  The ambiguity on this point may even act as 
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an incentive for copyright owners to design future TPMs so that their functions cannot 
be independently circumvented. 
 
In conclusion, Australian law on TPMs has lost what little certainty25 it achieved post 
Stevens v Sony,26 and the precise scope of the new laws will only be known after 
another epic battle between the owners and users of copyright material. 
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